
MaChIaVeLLII

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PARS I.

Or *Matchiavel's* Prince; with his Exhortation to deliver *Italy* from the *Barbarians*.

ECCLES. iii. 15.

That which hath been, is now; and that which is to be, hath already been, and God requireth that which is driven away.

Hereditary States, and such as have been accustomed to the Family of their Prince, are preserved with less difficulty than the new; it is sufficient not to transgress the Examples of their Predecessors, and to comply and frame themselves to occurring Accidents: So that if the Prince be a Person of Competent Industry, he will keep himself on the Throne, unless he be supplanted by some extraordinary Force; and even then Fortune can never turn Tail to the *Usurper*, but he will stand fair to be restored. P. 199.

A Natural Prince has not so much Occasion, or necessity to oppress his Subjects, whereby it follows he must be better belov'd, and retain more of the Affections of his People; (unless some extraordinary Vices concur to make him odious,) so that the Succession, and Coherence of his Government take away the Causes of Innovations; for one new Change leaves always (as in Buildings) a Toothing, and aptitude for another. *Ib.*

But the Difficulties consist in Governments lately acquired: The Tumults and Revolutions in such Monarchies, proceed from a Na-

tural Crossness or Difficulty in all new Conquests. For Men easily part with their Prince in hopes of bettering their Condition: But most commonly they are mistaken, and Experience tells them their Condition is much worse.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary Cause, necessitating the new Prince to disgust his new Subjects, by Taxes, standing Armies, and a Thousand other Inconveniencies, so that he makes those his Enemies who suffer, and are injured by his Usurpation, but cannot preserve their Friendship, who introduced him; because he can neither satisfy their Expectation, nor employ strong Remedies against them, by Reason of his Obligations. P. 200.

He who comes to be Prince by the Favour and Suffrage of the People, is oblig'd to keep them his Friends. Which (their Desire being nothing but Freedom from Oppression,) may be easily done. But he who is prefer'd by the Interest of the Nobles, against the Minds of the Commons is oblig'd, above all Things to ingratiate with the People, which will be, as the other, if he undertakes their Protection: And Men receiving good Offices, when they expected ill, are indear'd by the Surprise, and become better affected to their Benefactor, than perhaps they would have been, had he been made Prince by their immediate Favour. P. 211, 212.

A Prince must make it his Business to avoid such Things as may make him Odious or Contemptible. Nothing makes him so insufferably Odious as usurping his Subjects Estates, and debauching their Wives. But he is Contemptible when he is counted Effeminate, Light, Inconstant, Pusillanimous, and Irresolute. For a Prince ought to be Terrible in two Places: At home to his Subjects, and abroad to his Equals. P. 223, 224.

A Prince need not be much apprehensive of Conspiracies, whilst the People are his Friends: But when they are dissatisfied, and have taken a Prejudice against him, there is no Thing, nor no Person which he ought not to fear. And it has been the constant Care of all wise Princes, and all well-govern'd States, *not to reduce the Nobility to Despair, nor the People to Discontent*, which is one of the most material Things a Prince is to prevent. *Ibid.*

I will not trouble my self with *Heliogabulus*, *Macrinus*, nor *Julian*, who being all Effeminate and Contemptible, were quickly extinguish'd: But I will say, that the Princes of our Times are not oblig'd to satisfy the Soldiers in their respective Governments. If, in the Roman Empire, it was necessary to satisfy the Soldiers rather than the People, it was because the Soldiers were more Potent. At present it is more the Interest of all Princes (except the Great Turk and the Souldan) to comply with the People, because they are more considerable than the Soldiers. P. 227.

And seeing the Matter requires, I will not omit to remind a Prince who is but *newly* advanc'd, (and that by some inward Favour and Correspondence in the Country) that he considers well, what it was that dispos'd those Parties to befriend him. If it be not Affection

fection to him, but Pique and Animosity to the *Old* Government, it will cost much Trouble and Difficulty to keep 'em his Friends, because it will be impossible to satisfy 'em. And upon a serious Disquisition ancient and modern Examples will give us the Reason, and we shall find it more easy to gain such Persons as were satisfy'd with the former Government, and by Consequence his Enemies, than those who being disoblig'd, sided with him, and assisted to subvert it. *P. 228.*

Princes, and particularly those who are not of long standing, have found more fidelity from those whom they suspected at the beginning of their Reign, than from them who at first were their greatest Confidants: Those who opposed the Prince, in the beginning of his Government are easily brought over to him, and more strictly engaged to be Faithful, because they know that nothing but their future good Carriage will cancel the Prejudice against them. *Ib.*

The Business is, how a Prince may understand his *Minister*, and the Rule for that is Infallible. When you observe an Officer more careful of himself than of you, and all his Actions and Designs pointing at his own Interest and Advantage, that Man will never be a good Minister, nor ought you ever to repose any Confidence in him. *P. 231.*

Those who devote themselves entirely to the Business of their Prince, and are not Rapacious, are to be valu'd and preferr'd; those who are more remiss, and will not stick to their Prince, do it commonly upon two Motives, either out of Laziness or Fear, or upon Ambition and Design, the former may be trusted without much danger: But the Thoughts of the later being more intent upon their own Advantage than that of their Prince: Of these a Prince ought to have more than ordinary Care, and order 'em, as if they were Enemies profess'd; for in his Distress, they will be sure to set him forward, and do what they can to destroy him. *P. 211. 212.*

By fomenting Faction, the State must necessarily be destroy'd. For as Monsieur *de Lant* observ'd; if in *France* any Man would pronounce himself of the *King's Party*, he would be sure to be punish'd, because it would imply, that there was a *Party against* the King, and it was his Master's Desire, that his Kingdom and Cities should be all of a Mind: If therefore a Prince believes there is no way for him to keep his Towns in Obedience, but by keeping up *Factions*, it is a certain Sign of his *Weakness*; for being unable, by Force and Cunning to keep 'em under, he betakes himself to these pernicious Arts, which in peaceable Times may palliate a little, but when Troubles and Adversity come, will assuredly deceive him. *Disc. 412.*

As often as Princes tyrannize, and by enslaving and oppressing their Subjects, make Magistracy, which was intended for the Benefit of Mankind, prove a Plague, and destructive to it, let the Terror and the Guilt be never so great, it is impossible that

human Nature, which consists of Passion as well as Virtue, can support with Patience and Submission, the greatest Cruelty and Injustice; whenever the Weakness of their Princes, the Unanimity of the People, or any other favourable Accident shall give 'em reasonable Hopes to mend their Condition, or provide better for their own Interest by Insurrection. *Ibid.*

Those Princes and Commonwealths who would keep their Governments entire and uncorrupt, are above all Things to have a care of Religion and its Ceremonies, and preserve 'em in due Veneration. For in the whole World, there is not a greater Sign of imminent Ruin, than when God and his Worship are despis'd.—Nor can any thing portend the Ruin of the Church, with more certainty, than that those who are nearest the Church should have less Religion than other People? And he who should consider the *present Practise* with the *Primitive* Foundation, would find, that either utter Destruction, or some great Judgment was hanging over our Heads. *Disc.* 284.

*The Exhortation to deliver Italy from the Barbarians. **

HAVING weigh'd therefore all that is said before, and consider'd seriously with my self, whether in this Juncture of Affairs in *Italy* the Times are dispos'd for the Advancement of a New Prince, It seems to me, that at this present so many Things concur to the Exaltation of a new Prince, that I do not know any time that has been more proper than this. And if for the Manifestation of the Courage of *Moses*, it was necessary that the *Israelites* should be Captives in *Aegypt*, if for the discovery of the Magnanimity of *Cyrus*, the *Persians* were to be oppress'd by the *Modes*, so to demonstrate the Courage of an *Italian* Spirit, it was necessary that *Italy* should be reduc'd to its present Condition; that we should be in greater Bondage, and Servitude, then either the *Jews* or *Persians*. And tho' formerly some sparks of Vertue have appear'd in some Persons that might give us hopes, that God had ordain'd them for its Redemption, yet it was found afterwards, that in the very height and career of their Exploit, they were check'd and forsaken by Fortune, and poor *Italy* left half dead, expecting who would be her *Samaritan* to bind up her Wounds, and put an end to the Taxes and Expilations in the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Tuscany*. 'Tis manifest how She prays to God daily to send some Person who may

* By Barbarians, he means (as the ancient Romans us'd the Word) all Strangers. Machiavel's Letter, p. 4.

may redeem Her from the Insolence of the *Barbarians*; 'Tis manifest how prone and ready she is to follow the Banner, which any Man will take up: Nor is it, at present to be discern'd where she can repose her Hopes, with more Probability than in your *Family*, which by its own Courage and Interest, and the Favour of God and the Church, may be induc'd to make it self Head in her Redemption.

Your Enterprize is just and easy, and God Almighty is your Friend. You have Justice on your side: For that War is just which is necessary; and 'tis Piety to fight, where no Hope is left in any thing else. The People are universally dispos'd, and where the Disposition is so great, the Opposition can be but small. If therefore you are enclin'd to follow the Examples of those excellent Persons who redeem'd their Country, it is necessary, as a true Fundamental of all great Enterprizes, to provide your self with Forces of your own Subjects; for you cannot have more faithful nor better Soldiers than they; and tho' all of 'em be good, yet altogether they will be much better, when they find themselves not only commanded, but carest'd by a Prince of their own.

It is necessary therefore to be furnish'd with these Forces before you can be able with *Italian* Virtue, to vindicate your Country from the Oppression of Strangers: The poor *Germans* will be incapable to defend themselves. This Opportunity is, by no means to be slipt; that *Italy*, after so long Expectation, may see some Hopes of Deliverance: Nor can it be express'd with what Joy, with what Impatience, with what Fidelity, with what Compassion, with what Tears, such a Champion will be receiv'd into all the Provinces that have suffer'd by this barbarous Inundation.

What Gates would be shut against him? What People would deny him Obedience? What Malice would oppose him? What true *Italian* would refuse to follow him? There is not any Body but abhors and nauseates this barbarous Domination. Address your self then to the Work with as much Courage and Confidence as just Enterprizes are undertaken, that under your Ensigns our Country may be recover'd, and under your Conduct *Petrarch's* Prophecy may be fulfill'd, who has promis'd, that

*Virtue shall arm 'gainst Rage, and in short Fight,
Prove Roman Valour not extinguish'd quite,*

FINIS.

Select Maxims
OF
STATE
BY THE
Late Marquis of *HALLIFAX*.

1. **A** Prince who falleth out with the Laws breaketh with his best Friends.
2. The exalting his own Authority above the Laws, is like letting in his Enemies to Surprise his Guards. He can be sure will never run away from him.
3. A Prince that will say he can do no Good, except he may do every thing; teacheth the People to say they are Slaves, if they must not do whatever they have a mind to.
4. Power and Liberty, are like Heat and Moisture, where they are well mixt, every thing prospers; where they are Single, they are Destructive.
5. Arbitrary Power, is like most other things that are very hard, which are also very apt to break.
6. Where the least useful part of the People, have the most Credit with the Prince, Men will conclude that the way to get every thing, is to be good for nothing.

7. An

7. An extravagant Gift to one Man, raiseth the Market to every body else, so that in Consequence, the unlimited Bounty of an unthinking Prince maketh him a Beggar, let him have never so much Money.

8. If ordinary Beggars are Whip'd, the daily Beggars in fine Cloths (out of a proportionable Respect to their Quality) ought to be Hang'd.

9. Pride is as loud a Beggar as Want, and a great deal more Sawcy.

10. A *Prince*, who will give more to Importunity than Merit, had as good set out a Proclamation to all his loving Subjects to be good for nothing.

11. A wise *Prince* will not oblige his Courtiers, who are Birds of Prey, so as to disoblige his People, who are Beasts of Burthen.

12. It is safer for a *Prince* to judge of Men from what they do to one another, than what they do to him.

13. It is a gross Mistake to think, that a Knave between Man and Man, can be Honest to a *King*, whom of all other Men they generally make the least scruple to deceive.

14. A *Prince* who can ever trust the Man that hath once deceiv'd him, loseth the Right of being faithfully dealt with by any other Person.

15. It is not possible for a *Prince* to find out such an *honest Knave* as will let no body else cheat him.

16. If a *Prince* do's not shew an Aversion to Knaves, there will be an Inference that will be very natural, let it be never so unmannerly.

17. A *Prince* who followeth his own Opinion too soon, is in Danger of repenting it too late.

18. It is less dangerous for a *Prince* to mind too much what the People say than too little.

19. The *Prince* is to take Care that the greatest part of the People may not be angry at the same time; for though the first beginning of their *Ill Humour* should be against one another, yet if not stop'd, it will naturally end in Anger against him.

20. If *Princes* wou'd reflect how much they are in the Power of their Ministers, they wou'd be more circumspect in the Choice of them.

21. A wise *Prince* will Suspect good Servants against Mens Anger; but not support ill ones against their Complaint.

22. There is more Dignity in open Violence, than in the unskillfull cunning of a *Prince*, who goes about to Impose upon the People.

23. The People will ever support the Remedies for the Diseases of the State, where they are wholly excluded from seeing how they are prepared.

24. Changing Hands without Changing Measures, is as if a Drunkard in a Dropsy, should Change his Doctors and not his Diet.

25. When a *Princes* Example ceaseth to have force of a Law, it is a sure Sign that his Power is wasting, and there is but little Distance between Mens neglecting to imitate, and their refusing to obey.

26. A *People* may let a *King* fall, yet still remain a *People*; But if a *King* let his *People* slip from him he is no longer *King*.

FINIS.

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